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The Future of Legal Science in Civil Law Systems
Horacio Spector*
I want to thank Professor Saul Litvinoff very much for his kind
and generous presentation. I am very honored by the opportunity to
give the Tucker Lecture, mainly because of the high prestige this
Institute of Law has as a center of legal research in the civil law
world. I am very grateful, too, because this lecture gives me a
wonderful occasion to address an issue that has attracted my
intellectual interest for a long time.
As Professor Litvinoff indicated, I will discuss the future of legal
science in civil law systems, particularly in private law. I hasten to
say that I will not try to predict what legal science will be in the
coming years. That depends on a great variety of sociological and
institutional factors that do not concern me today. I will rather focus
on what legal science could become in civil law systems given the
special features of civil law and the theoretical investigations that
North American legal scholarship has been making in recent years.
I. THE NATURE OF LEGAL SCIENCE
I am wary that the expression "legal science" will sound to many
as a convenient label to exalt legal scholarship into a "hard" science,
like physics or biology. Interestingly, the feeling of semantic
manipulation will vary in intensity depending on the background
legal system. While it will probably sound strange to common
lawyers, the expression is natural in the civil law world, where legal
scholarship has traditionally aspired to become a science-like
discipline. Though Jhering's "instrumentalism" and related
jurisprudential outlooks have introduced widespread skepticism about
the scientific status of civilian scholarship, as late as 1969 John
Henry Merryman felt sure to declare: "The contemporary civil law
world is still under the sway of one of the most powerful and
coherent schools of thought in the history of the civil law tradition.
We will call it legal science."1 Does civilian scholarship have a claim
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. John Henry Merryman, The Civil law Tradition: An Introduction to the
Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 65 (1969).
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to scientific status? How can we explain this contrast between
common law scholarship and civilian legal science?
Science is usually defined as an intellectual enterprise purporting
to explain and predict empirical phenomena. In fact, scientific theories
abstract from the multifarious details of empirical facts and try to
subsume them under abstract and universal propositions. At the same
time, scientific theories must be subject to empirical testing, though
philosophers of science disagree about the upshot of this requirement.
While logical positivists maintained that observation data can verify
scientific hypotheses, Karl Popper famously claimed that refutability
of theories is the mark of science.2 Leaving aside this discrepancy, the
traditional view regards theorization (i.e., the construction of universal
laws) and empirical testing as the two distinguishing features of
science.3 Yet a revisionist trend, led by Thomas Kuhn and Paul
Feyerabend, challenged, during the 1960s, the claim that scientific
theories entail testable empirical statements. Relying on a careful
study of the history of science, proponents of this approach deny the
possibility of a neutral observation language. If observation scientific
language is bound to be theory-laden, there is no simple way of
verifying or falsifying scientific propositions, and scientific
explanation comes close to Verstehen (i.e., interpretation), the bite
noire of empiricist philosopher§. For simplicity's sake, I will not
consider these revisionist views. here. As I have shown elsewhere,
such views do not allow so neat a demarcation between science and
non-scientific disciplines and, hence, are more congenial to the idea
that legal scholarship is a science.4
I said that civil law scholarship sees itself as a science-like
discipline. One explanation of this is the high degree of abstract
systematization that doctrinal studies achieved in the civil law world
during the nineteenth century. As is well known, the shaping of
European legal science began with the reception of Roman Law in the
Early Middle Ages and culminated with the works of Savigny, Jhering,
and the Begriffsjurisprudenz in the nineteenth century. In this long
process legal science evolved from glosses and commentaries on the
Corpus luris Civilis to abstract and complex theories.5
2. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (2d ed. 1936); Rudolf Carnap,
Testability and Meaning (1950); Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(1959); C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science (1965).
3. Frederick Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific
Theories, in The Structure of Scientific Theories (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977)
(exposing the "received" theory of science and its theoretical alternatives).
4. Horacio Spector, La base empirica en la ciencia juridica, 23 Revista de
Ciencias Sociales 33 (1983).
5. Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe (Tony Weir trans.,
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The great civilian jurists sought to turn a vast array of legal
materials flowing from different sources into a coherent and
complete legal system premised on an abstract and orderly
theoretical structure. For instance, Pandectistic legal science
systematized German customary rules and Roman Law. That
theoretical structure could be interpreted in two different ways.
First, it might be conceived as the systematic reconstruction of
spontaneous cultural patterns developed by a certain community.
The Historic School, led by Gustav Hugo and Friedrich Karl von
Savigny, emphasized the analogy between law and language as
cultural manifestations of the spirit of a people.6 Savigny thought
that in primitive societies "law lives, like language, in the popular
consciousness;" this "political element" of law is complemented and
transformed in modern States by the systematic contributions of
legal science, which he dubs the "technical element."7 In Geist des
roemischen Rechts, Jhering elaborated on this conception of legal
science by analogizing it to chemistry! Chemistry is analytical in
that it seeks to explain complex phenomena in terms of the behavior
of simple bodies. In the same way, said Jhering, legal science
reduces complex legal rules to simple notions through simple legal
concepts. For instance, just as the chemist analyzes water as a
compound of two molecules of hydrogen and one of oxygen, the
jurist defines the complex notion of "hypothec" as a real right on
immovable property made liable for the performance of an
obligation. Thus, the civil jurist analyzes legal institutions, reduces
them to simple notions, and combines such notions in different
ways. The analogy between chemistry and legal science suggests an
essentialist reading of legal definitions. When the jurist captures the
essence or true nature of a legal concept, he displays the qualities of
a real thing. This conception of legal concepts agrees with the
Aristotelian conception of science as a body of propositions
premised on essentialist, realist definitions. On this view, legal
1995).
6. Id. at 300-16; William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was
It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 2012-43 (1995).
7. See Frederick Charles Von Savigny, Of The Vocation of Our Age for
Legislation And Jurisprudence (Abraham Hayward trans., photo. reprint 1975)
(1831).
8. Rudolf von Ihering, El espfritu del derecho romano 488-90 (Trans. 2001).
On Ihering's conception of legal science, compare Antonio Hemdndez-Gil, Jhering
y el mdtodo de la construccirn juridica, 10/11 Revista de Ciencias Sociales 315
(1976-77); Antonio Hemnmdez-Gil & Alvarez Cienfuegos, El estatuto cientifico de
la construccirn jurfdica en Ihering, 10/11 Revista de Ciencias Sociales 339
(1976-77); Enrique Zuleta Puceiro, Paradigma dogmdtico y Ciencia del Derecho
(1981).
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definitions are not a conventional way to convey or establish the
meaning of legal terms, but true descriptions of the essence of legal
institutions.9
Second, the theoretical structure of civil law could be viewed as
the representation of natural moral laws or moral principles
underlying positive law. To be sure, Grotius, Pufendorf, Kant, and
other members of the rationalist school of Natural Law did not mean
their systems of natural law to provide an account of positive law.
Yet, we could interpret the fundamental principles of civil law
scholarship, typically gathered in the so called "General Parts," as
descriptions of abstract moral principles that are objectively true or
valid. According to this interpretation, the analyses of juridical
concepts would not be lexicographical or conventional definitions,
but normative positions defended under the guise of definitions.
This interpretation of legal science resembles Dworkin's
reconstruction of common law. Dworkin claims that the
fundamental point of common law is "to guide and constrain the
power of government... "in such a way that ".... force not be used
or withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no
matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed or
required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past
political decisions about when collective force is justified."" The
end of legal theory, according to Dworkin, is to reveal the most
abstract moral principles underlying common law. In a similar vein,
the end of legal science, on this interpretation, would be to reveal the
most abstract moral principles underlying codified legal materials.
In either reading, legal science provides solutions that go beyond
positive law, as literally construed. Contemporary legal philosophers
in civil law jurisdictions reach the same conclusion when they claim
that the theoretical structure of legal science serves to conceal its true
normative role, conferring on contestable legal doctrines an aura of
scientific objectivity. Civilian lawyers sometimes achieve this
purpose through the fiction of a "rational legislator," a mythical
character defined as a legislator who issues norms aiming at
coherence, completeness, and efficiency. This fiction orients the
interpretation of the code in the direction of their normative and
political positions."
9. Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism § 10 (2d ed. 1960) (criticizing
methodological essentialism).
10. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 93 (1986); Carlos Santiago Nino, Los
lIfmites de la responsabilidad penal 1-33 (1980) (discussing the possibility of
applying Dworkinian legal methodology to Criminal Law Dogmatics); Horacio
Spector, Enunciados jurtdicos y razones para actuar, in Decisiones normativas:
Ensayos en homenaje a Julia Barragdn (John Harsanyi et al. eds., 1999).
11. Carlos Santiago Nino, Consideraciones sobre la DogmdticaJurfdica (1974);
258 [Vol. 65
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Civilian jurists also resort to a procedure called "legal induction."
Let me illustrate this procedure with the principle that the debtor's
patrimony is the common pledge of the creditors. Whereas this
principle is laid down in article 3183 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
1 2
the Argentine Civil Code lacks a specific provision to that effect.
However, Argentinejurists maintain that the principle can be inferred
from the Code by "juridical induction" or "construction." They
invoke various particular provisions that seem to be applications of
that principle. For instance, article 961 states that any creditor has a
right to revoke an act made by the debtor in fraud of his rights, 3 and
article 962, paragraph three, requires that the credit founding the
action have a date prior to the debtor's act; 4 there is no indication
about the date of acquisition of the object of the fraud. The
revocatory action can be seen as a consequence of the principle that
the entirety of the debtor's property, present and future, is charged
with the performance of his obligations. Still, the principle is not a
logical deduction from any set of provisions in the Civil Code. It is
the other way around. Jurists can explain those provisions by
hypothesizing the principle.15
Legal concepts perform normative functions, their factual
appearance notwithstanding. Typically, the civilian lawyer employs
syllogistic reasoning grounded on propositions belonging to the
theoretical structure of legal science to obtain legal solutions for
concrete cases. For example, the definition of "juridical act" is a way
of establishing, among other things, the conditions of enforceability
of contracts. Endorsing a usual definition in civilian scholarship, the
Argentine Civil Code defines, in article 944, juridical acts as "licit
voluntary acts having as their immediate end to establish between
persons juridical relations, or to create, modify, transfer, conserve or
extinguish rights."' 6 By deploying this concept, the Argentine Civil
Code applies general rules of intention, fraud, and simulation to a
diversity of acts. In its turn, the Code says that juridical acts made by
essential mistake are unintentional and, hence, cannot be considered
voluntary in the sense required by the definition of juridical act. An
act made by essential mistake is not a juridical act in a strict sense;
Leszek Nowak, A Concept of Rational Legislator, in Polish Contributions to the
Theory and Philosophy of Law (Zygmunt Ziembinski ed., 1987).
12. La. Civ. Code art. 3183.
13. C6d. Civ. art. 961 (Argentina).
14. Id. art. 962.
15. Horacio Spector, La dogm6tica juridica: Algunos problemas
epistemoldgicos, 29 Revista de Ciencias Sociales 9 (1986) (analyzing "legal
induction" as a form of deductive reasoning yielding counterfactual legal
propositions).
16. C6d. Civ. art. 944.
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therefore, the clause mandating nullity of acts made with essential
error seems almost a corollary of the definition of "juridical act."
Principles in civil law are defeasible and, therefore, syllogistic
reasoning sometimes fails because of exceptions in the intended
premises. Let me illustrate this feature of civilian principles by
appealing, again, to the concept of juridical act and one if its species-
payment of an obligation. Article 926 of the Argentine Civil Code
says that error concerning the main cause of an act, or the quality of
the thing taken into consideration, makes the relevant act subject to
annulment. 7 Since payment of obligations falls under the concept of
juridical act, the rule should also apply to payments made by mistake.
This means that payment made by error concerning the person is
unintentional and, therefore, can be annulled. In fact, Article 784 of
the Code says that he who by legal or factual mistake believes
himself debtor and delivers a thing to someone else in putative
payment is entitled to recover what was paid from the person who
received it. 8 However, deductive strings across the formal structure
can break down at certain points. For instance, article 785 establishes
an exception to the rule of article 784. When the creditor has
destroyed the title of the obligation as a result of payment, the person
who paid by error cannot recover the thing, though he still has the
right to recover an equivalent value from the true debtor. 9 Similarly,
recovery is not possible when the payment was made in performance
of a natural obligation.2"
Legal science possesses a factual dimension, too. In effect,
civilian doctrines are criticized and, eventually, given up when they
face numerous counterexamples, that is, rules that are anomalous in
light of such doctrines.2' Let me illustrate this point with the theory
of possession. As is well known, Savigny claimed that the
foundation of the legal protection of possession is to avoid a wrong
against the possessor (i.e., a violent behavior against his person)."
In Grund des Besitzschutzes, Jhering argued that Savigny's theory
did not accord with several provisions in Roman Law, among them
the lack of protection of detentio alieno nomine (detention on behalf
of another). He wrote: "In fact, if [possessory interdicts] are means
of protection against the wrong committed on the person, if the
possessory relation does not have but a subordinate importance,
which reduces itself to the factual element of the situation, then it
17. Id. art. 926.
18. Id. art. 784.
19. Id. art. 785.
20. Id. art. 516.
21. Josd Vilanova, Elementos de Filosoffa del Derecho 49-50 (1977).
22. Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Trait6 de la Possession en Droit Romain 25
(Trans. 1870).
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cannot be understood why the person who detains a thing must
depend on the possessor to be protected from a wrong against his
person. 23
The program of turning legal scholarship into a science was not
exclusive of nineteenth century civilian culture. It accompanied the
birth of American legal scholarship too. According to Professor
Anthony Kronman, Langdell defended the Hobessian understanding
of law and politics as a kind of geometry whose foundational
principles could be discovered by natural reason.24 In contrast to the
classical conception of common law as a realm of practical wisdom
and experience, Langdell embraced the basic tenets of legal
formalists such as Bentham and Austin, who thought that law could
be reconstructed as a rational order. However, instead of favoring a
reconstruction from without, in the form of Enlightenment codes,
Langdell maintained that law professors could reconstruct common
law decisions from within to reach a "geometrical" system of legal
principles.
After the demise of legal formalism, the Langdellian conception
of common law scholarship as a formal science progressively
vanished from American legal culture. However, the triumphant
instrumentalist movement pioneered by Holmes and Cardozo gave
legal scholarship an experimental and empirical bent. Professor
Thomas Ulen has recently argued that doctrinal studies in common
law have for a long time been inclined to empirical testing.25 One of
his examples is the study conducted by Professor Stanley Henderson
in the late 1960s about detrimental reliance as the basis of promissory
estoppel. Among other findings, Professor Henderson showed that,
over the previous ten years, in every case in which courts accepted a
plea for promissory estoppel they did not see it as a separate basis of
contract enforcement but just as an auxiliary rule to apply the
standard principle of bargain promises. He also demonstrated that
those cases invariably involved commercial negotiation, rather than
gratuitous promises.
Anglo-American legal scholarship is not usually called a science,
despite its traditional empirical bent. The reason possibly resides in
the fact that, unlike civilian scholarship, it did not achieve a high
degree of abstract systematization. However, in the last decades,
with the emergence of law and economics and philosophical accounts
of particular areas of common law, Anglo-American legal
23. Rudolf von Jhering, Teorfa de la posesi6n: Del fundamento de la protecci6n
posesoria 13 (Trans. 1892). The translation of the quoted passage is from the
Spanish version.
24. Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 170-85 (1993).
25. Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work,
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 4 U. 11. L. Rev. 875 (2002).
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scholarship is reaching a high degree of theorization and complexity.
This trend has animated Professor Ulen to claim that legal
scholarship is transforming itself into a science.26
During the nineteenth century, civilian legal scholarship
developed a theoretical structure capable of explaining and
systematizing a vast array of particular facts and adopted a practice
of subjecting scientific propositions to some kind of testing. These
two traits may have provided some justification for calling it a
"science." After the process of civilian codification was in practice
completed with the passing of the German Civil Code (BGB), legal
science started to decline in intellectual vitality. Today, civilian
jurists are still engaged in the systematization of codified rules, and,
in particular, of judicial decisions that seek to adjust the code to new
economic, social, and technological circumstances. However, the
isolation of such studies from law and economics and moral and
legal philosophy-that is, the two mainstream theoretical paradigms
in legal research-is increasingly affecting the nature of such
scholarship. Just as civilian scholarship acquired its moment of
splendor working in tandem with philosophical and historic studies,
I suggest that it could catch up with present common-law
scholarship by deepening its ties to moral and legal philosophy and
law and economics.
11. THEORETICAL PARADIGMS IN CIVILIAN SCHOLARSHIP
I want to discuss now whether law and economics and moral and
legal philosophy are helpful to understand civil law, as they are
proving useful to explain common law. I want to suggest that both
paradigms are applicable to civil law. Yet I will claim that, because
of the quite different historical evolution of the two systems of law,
the relative value of each paradigm is different-moral and legal
philosophy being more important in civil law. Therefore, we cannot
expect an automatic alignment of civilian scholarship with common
law scholarship.
The usefulness of legal philosophy to account for civil law
should be deemed uncontroversial. In historic terms, the current
philosophical paradigm originated as a way of understanding civil
law. Let us be reminded that the philosophical approach to law
nurtures itself from the rationalistic Natural Law theories that arose
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Furthermore,
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Kant constructed their systems of natural
law with a view to systematizing the fundamental principles of the
26. See id.
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Corpus luris Civilis. As is well known, Roman Law was studied in
continental Europe since the end of the eleventh century. By
contrast, Professor Coing observes that English common law
developed independently from Roman Canon Law.27 Rationalistic
Natural Law philosophy not only provided abstract foundations for
fundamental Roman Law institutions, like possession, ownership,
and contract, but also introduced the ideal of codification and, by
doing so, transformed Roman Law into a formal system based on
natural reason. On its influence on European legal science, Franz
Wiacker remarks:
After Hobbes and Pufendorf ... logical proof within a
coherent system became the Law of Reason's very
touchstone of the soundness of its methodical axioms. In the
eighteenth century it started to put order into accounts of
positive law, and thereby created the system which still
dominates the statute-books and textbooks of the European
continent.28
One cannot understand German legal science, for example,
without taking into consideration the influence of Pufendorf and
Kant, among others. In fact, the most abstract part of Savigny's
legal theorizing can be regarded as a philosophical theory of civil
law. Though all this fascinating intellectual process was
overshadowed by codification during the nineteenth century, there
is no doubt that civil law, because of its historic evolution, can be
fruitfully understood with the aid of contemporary legal philosophy.
However, the new body of literature on the philosophic foundations
of private law-intellectually associated with the school of Rational
Natural Law-is emerging, not in Europe to explain civil law, but in
North America to account for common law. This is paradoxical, as
common law developed without the systematic influence of moral
philosophy. One should expect those philosophical accounts to be
more directly applicable to civil law, given that such accounts took
their cue from the School of Natural Law. Figure 1 indicates how
civil law and common-law scholarship have reversed their
traditional positions in terms of theorization.
27. See Helmut Coing, The Roman Law as Ius Commune on the Continent, 89
L. Q. REv. 505 (1973). I take this to be consistent with the traditional intellectual
influence of Roman Law on English judges.
28. Wieacker, supra note 5, at 218.
2632004]
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Fig. 1. Features of civilian and common-law scholarship
Present situation Historical development
Civilian No theoretical paradigm Systematic influence of
scholarship rationalist Natural Law
Two theoretical
Common-law paradigms No systematic theoretical
scholarship (law and economics and influence
normative philosophy)
I will content myself with illustrating, with one example, how
civilian and common law scholarship can be amenable to different
theoretical explanations. My example is remedies for breach of
contract. Following classic Roman Law, common law instituted
expectation damages as the primary remedy for breach of contract.
Courts can only order specific performance under special
circumstances (for example, if the object of the contract is not a
fungible thing). In contrast, in civil law the primary remedy for
breach of contract is specific performance, rather than money
damages. For example, article 1134 of the French Civil Code
declares that contracts must be performed in good faith, and article
1136 stipulates that an obligation to give implies an obligation to
deliver the thing and to preserve it until delivery.29 Similarly the
Argentine Code stipulates in article 505 that the creditor, in case of
nonperformance of a contract, has the right to choose among the
following measures: to force performance of the obligation, to obtain
performance by a third party at the debtor's expense, or to obtain
appropriate damages. °
The authors of a well-known casebook on Comparative Law
write: "The principle that obligations, especially contractual
obligations, as a rule can be specifically enforced, and that ordinarily
it is for the obligee and not for the court to choose between specific
performance and a non-specific remedy, has been adopted in the
overwhelming majority of civil-law systems."'" However, this is
only true of obligations to give. Civil law systems adopt different
modalities with respect to obligations to do. The soft position is
followed by the French Civil Code, which provides in article 1142
29. C. civ. arts. 1134, 1136 (France).
30. C6d. Civ. art. 505 (Argentina).
31. Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law 665 (5th ed. 1988).
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that an obligation to do becomes an obligation to pay damages in case
of nonperformance.32 The Argentine Civil Code follows Marcad6's
interpretation of the French code. Thus, article 629 lays down that
the creditor can obtain forced performance of an obligation to do,
except when this requires exerting violence on the debtor.33 The
German Civil Code (BGB) adopts the hard position. In article 241,
it states that "[tjhe effect of an obligation is that the creditor is
entitled to claim performance from the debtor., 34 Moreover, the
German Code of Civil Procedure empowers courts to apply fines and
imprisonment to compel the performance of an obligation to do when
the act cannot be performed by a third party.35
The above difference indicates that civilian contract law and
Anglo-American contract law are amenable to different sorts of
explanation. Indeed, civilian contract law was influenced by the
School of Natural Law and its emphasis on individual autonomy,
while contractual remedies in common law rather echo the
practicality of Roman Law. Under the influence of natural lawyers,
the law of contracts in civil law was shaped around the value of
individual autonomy, which makes it recalcitrant to instrumentalist
accounts. As Professor Catherine Valcke observes, "[t]he three
foundational principles of civilian contract law-freedom of contract,
binding force of contract, and consensualism-were directly derived
from Kant's postulate of the autonomous will.
36
There are two arguments that support my suggestion. First, I
have said that expectation damages are an efficient remedy for breach
of contract. On the contrary, specific performance can only be
vindicated as an efficient remedy under special conditions (for
example, high renegotiation costs)." Since expectation damages are
the primary remedy in common law, the economic paradigm provides
a successful explanation of this feature of common law. On the other
hand, the theory of contractual obligation as promissory obligation
can nicely explain why specific performance is the fundamental
remedy in civil law. In fact, the general provision of specific
performance is a natural corollary of the idea that contracts are valid
as an exercise of individual autonomy. This idea has exerted decisive
32. C. Civ. art. 1142.
33. C6d. Civ. art. 629.
34. § 241 BGB (Germany) (translated in The German Civil Code (Simon L.
Goren trans., Rev. ed. 1994)).
35. § 888 ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung).
36. Catherine Valcke, The Unhappy Marriage of Corrective and Distributive
Justice in the New Civil Code of Quebec, 46 U. Toronto L.J. 539, 567 (1996).
37. However, Professor Ulen argues that specific performance is more efficient
than expectation damages because it avoids the need to estimate subjective values.
See Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984).
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influence on the development of civilian contract law. If the binding
force of contracts depends on an act of the will, damages (both under
the expectation and the reliance standards) could at most be a second
best remedy.
Interestingly, economic lawyers reach a similar conclusion.
Thus, Professors Kaplow and Shavell have argued that the
explanation of contract law based on the duty to keep promises
distorts common law, because it implies the adoption of specific
performance as primary remedy for breach of contract.38 When it
comes to civil law, the result reverses. It is really the economic
explanation that distorts civil law, because civil law does not allow
breaking a contract and paying monetary damages, except when the
obligee opts for the latter remedy or, under the French system, when
the contract embodies an obligation to do. The idea of an efficient
breach (in particular, of an obligation to give) is completely alien to
civilian contract law. It is not economics, but rather moral
philosophy that has the initial appeal to account for this aspect of
civil law. This lends support to my contention that moral philosophy
is in a better position to explain civilian contract law than the
economic paradigm. At the same time, the latter paradigm seems to
work well in common law.
Second, one possible explanation of the shift from damages to
specific performance sees it as related to the view that natural law
philosophers adopted with respect to the transfer of ownership and
risk in sale. In Roman Law, as a rule, risk of damage or destruction
passed to the buyer at the moment of agreement, but ownership only
passed to the buyer with physical delivery. As Professor Alan
Watson points out, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Barbeyrac thought that it
was irrational to locate at different times the transfer of ownership
and that of risk. Whereas Grotius and Barbeyrac defended the
proposition that both ownership and risk must pass together to the
buyer at the moment of agreement, Pufendorf affirmed that the
transference should occur at the moment of delivery. Under the
influence of Barbeyrac, the French Civil Code changed the Roman
rule and provided that both ownership and risk get transferred to the
buyer at the moment of agreement.: On the contrary, the Argentine
Civil Code and the BGB followed Pufendorf's position and stated
that risk and ownership pass together to the buyer, but at the moment
of physical delivery.
Confronted with these enigmatic differences, the economic
analysis of law seems unhelpful. From an economic viewpoint, it is
38. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2002).
39. See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law
ch.14 (1993).
[Vol. 65
HORACIO SPECTOR
efficient to make an avoidable loss fall on the party who can at the
cheapest cost reduce its risk and, therefore, get insured against it. But
the kind of loss at hand is, by hypothesis, beyond the debtor's
control. So one could suggest that the differences are almost
accidental. Defending this interpretation, Watson writes: "the
French rejection of the Roman rules on this point was not the result
of social development, nor due to inherent practical weaknesses of
the older system nor the consequence of an awareness of the logical
necessity of their own preferred view."4 Yet he fails to offer a
theoretical explanation of accidental rules. One could suggest that
many legal rules lack a specific rationale. Just as language rules,
they are useful devices to coordinate individual action.41 On this
view, it does not matter when the transfer of risk and ownership takes
place; it only matters that we all agree on one single rule. Perhaps
Savigny had the idea of coordination in mind when he drew the
analogy between law and language, to which I have earlier referred.42
One could also try a philosophical explanation. This explanation
would be simple and plausible in French civil law. Let us be
reminded that in the French Code ownership passes to the buyer at
the moment of consent. This rule fits well the provision of specific
performance as the primary remedy for breach of obligations to give.
If the proprietary title passes to the buyer when the agreement is
made, the buyer should obviously have the option to require delivery
of his property. My point is not that the French drafters changed the
Roman system of transfer of ownership by locating it at the moment
of agreement because French law had already substituted specific
performance for money damages as the primary remedy for breach
of contract. Nor do I mean that the proprietary theory is the best
philosophical account of civil law's preference for specific
performance. Rather, I submit that both changes can be explained on
the basis of the autonomy-based conception of contracts endorsed by
the School of Natural Law. At those points where moral philosophy
influenced civil law, law and economics is unhelpful, and the
philosopher carries the day.
Despite this historical contrast between common law and civil
law, legal philosophers in civil law jurisdictions usually ignore the
kind of philosophical analyses that their colleagues in common law
jurisdictions have been recently cultivating. Since the philosophical
paradigm is largely a reaction to law and economics, the lack of
interest might be due to the difficult and slow reception of law and
40. Id. at 85.
41. See Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy ch.3
(1999).
42. See text accompanying supra note 7.
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economics in civil law countries.43 I suggest that we could explain
this phenomenon by taking into consideration one fundamental
feature of civil law.
In civil law, judicial decisions are grounded on formal reasons,
that is, rules defined by its formal attributes, rather than on moral,
economic, political, institutional, or other social considerations.
Whereas the American judge, for example, is often expected to use
policy-based reasoning to interpret precedents and to establish new
rules, the civilian judge is bound to apply the civil code or the formal
system of legal science that mixes itself with the code. Legal science
is more formal than common law scholarship. Civil law reasoning
typically starts from abstract premises and concepts and, therefore,
gives little room to the kind of consequentialist, forward-looking
reasoning on which law and economics relies. Economic
considerations are not completely absent from legal science, but their
role is a restricted one. When formal reasoning does not yield a
definite answer to a legal question, the leal scientist usually resorts
to the fiction of the rational legislator. This means that in legal
science, consequentialist, economic reasoning is limited to hard
cases.
English law also has a formal system of legal sources, for
precedents are formal reasons. Professors Patrick Atiyah and Robert
Summers have thoroughly shown that the American and the British
doctrines of the sources of law are very different in terms of
formality.4" In effect, stare decisis is a more rigid doctrine in British
law, leaving little leeway to explicit policy analysis. It is American
common law, rather than British law, that can be contrasted with civil
law in terms of formality. In a similar vein, Professor Richard Posner
has recently argued that British common law and European civil law
are comparable in terms of formality. Both British and European
judges train themselves in bureaucratic careers that accept as
axiomatic the functional separation between the legislature and the
judiciary. It is only in the United States where judges feel free to
systematically employ consequentialist, instrumental reasoning.'
This could explain why law and economics is more easily accepted
in American legal circles than in British and European ones.
43. See R. Cooter and J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries:
Past, Present, Future, 11 Int'l. Rev. L. & Econ. 261 (1991). See also the other
articles published in this issue.
44. See Carlos Santiago Nino, Consideraciones Sobre La Dogmdtica Jur(dica
(1974); Leszek Nowak, A Concept of Rational Legislator, in Polish Contributions
to the Theory and Philosophy of Law 137 (Zygmunt Ziembiriski ed., 1987).
45. See P. S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-
American Law (1987).
46. See Richard A. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America
(1996).
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M. CONCLUSION
I have argued that civilian scholarship could regain the
intellectual splendor it enjoyed in the nineteenth century by resorting
to the philosophic and economic studies that are now cropping up in
common-law jurisdictions. I have also suggested that philosophy
seems more important than economics in civil law, given the
systematic influence of natural law on the shaping of civil codes and
legal science. As I said at the beginning of this lecture, I cannot
predict what the future of legal science in civil law jurisdictions will
be. I have only tried to indicate a possible orientation that could
enrich our understanding of civil law. This orientation could also
allow common law scholars as well as civilian jurists to share an
intellectual space and participate in the debate on the theoretical
foundations of law. Many thanks for your attention.

